

Message Text

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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; CINCEUR FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, PEPR, PGOV, PINR, PINT, AF, US
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND US-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 211104

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE GIVES OUR LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL SCENE AND RECOMMENDS OUR TAKING A LOW PROFILE STANCE, FOR THE PRESENT, IN ECONOMIC AID. I BELIEVE SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE THRUST OF THE BASIC INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAQI, HAS AVOIDED
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CHARACTERIZING THE PARTY OR THE REGIME AS COMMUNIST OR MARXIST-LENINIST, I BELIEVE HE AND SOME OF HIS SENIOR LIEUTENANTS ARE DEDICATED COMMUNISTS, ALTHOUGH OF AN AFGHAN VARIETY THAT STILL DEFIES PRECISE DESCRIPTION. THEY VIEW THEMSELVES AS REVOLUTIONARIES WHO ARE DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF AFGHAN SOCIETY ALONG SOCIALIST LINES, ALTHOUGH THEIR ACTUAL REFORM MOLD SO FAR IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF RECOGNIZED COMMUNIST

GOVERNMENTS ELSEWHERE. WHILE TARAKI AND AMIN MAY BELIEVE IN AND, INDEED, DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION, I FEAR THAT THEY ARE PURSUING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES WHICH CAN ONLY INCREASE THIS GOVT'S RELIANCE UPON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. THEIR WORLD OUTLOOK IS MARXIST-LENINIST ORIENTED. THEY FIND THEMSELVES CLOSELY IN TUNE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IDEOLOGICALLY, AND VIEW THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AS THEIR TRUE FRIENDS AND ALLIES. PAKISTAN IS SEEN AS THE MAIN POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE TARAKI REGIME; AND THE LEADERSHIP HERE, GIVEN ITS CONSPIRATORIAL BACKGROUND, CANNOT HELP BUT BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA, AND PERHAPS OTHERS TOO, ARE COLLUDING WITH ISLAMABAD TO SUBVERT THEIR LEFTIST GOVT. THE REGIME PRIVATELY CONTENTS IT HAS EVIDENCE LINKING THE U.S. WITH A COUNTERCOUP GROUP ALLEGEDLY LED BY FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL QADER. GIVEN THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" THRUST OF THIS REGIME'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS INNATE SUSPICIONS OF THE U.S., THE OUTLOOK FOR CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THIS REGIME AND THE U.S. IN BILATERAL AREAS, SUCH AS AID ASSISTANCE AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES, AND ON MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES, APPEARS DISCOURAGING. EVIDENCE IS BUILDING UP THAT THE TARAKI REGIME WOULD WELCOME U.S. MONEY, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY, BUT WISHES TO LIMIT THE PRESENCE AND ASSISTANCE OF OUR TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE NEW GOVT WILL RESTRICT, OF ITS OWN VOLITION, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. IN VIEW OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THIS REGIME IS

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MOVING INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY, I BELIEVE IT PRUDENT NOT TO PRESS A LARGE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT UPON THE NEW GOVT, BUT RATHER THAT WE MAINTAIN A HOLDING PATTERN UNTIL THE SITUATION CLARIFIES, AND CONFINE OURSELVES TO AREAS OF CLEARLY MUTUAL INTEREST. IN SUBSTANCE, I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE U.S. PRESENCE HERE EXPLOITED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONSOLIDATE AND LEGITIMIZE A REGIME WHICH I BELIEVE HAS INTERESTS INIMICAL TO OUR OWN. INDEED, A LOW-PROFILE AND CAUTIOUS POSTURE AT THIS TIME MIGHT GIVE STRENGTH TO THOSE WHO MAY REMAIN IN POSITIONS OF SOME INFLUENCE AND WHO MAY CHOOSE TO ARGUE FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT AND GENUINELY NONALIGNED AFGHAN POSITION IN THE WORLD, TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED FLOW OF MUCH-NEEDED ASSISTANCE FROM FREE WORLD DONORS. IF WE DECIDE THAT THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE POSTURE, WE OUGHT TO INFORM OTHER INTERESTED STATES, SUCH AS THE FRG, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, IRAN, AND JAPAN OF THE CAUTION WITH WHICH WE ARE APPROACHING ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AND POSSIBILITIES. SINCE I BELIEVE AFGHANISTAN, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, COULD OVER TIME POSE A SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO PAKISTAN AND OUR BROADER INTERESTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, I SUGGEST WE CONSIDER, ALONG WITH OTHER IMPORTANT AID DONORS, A RENEWED EFFORT TO BOLSTER PAKISTAN ECONOMICALLY NOW THAT THE REPROCESSING ISSUE APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED TOWARD RESOLUTION. A RESILIENT AND INTERNALLY HEALTHY PAKISTAN AND IRAN, COOPERATING

INCREASINGLY WITH INDIA AND THE MODERATE MUSLIM STATES TO THE WEST, MAY BE THE BEST WAY OF COMBATING A POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVE THREAT FROM AN IRREDENTIST, LEFTIST AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY

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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

2. INTERNAL POLITICAL POWER AND POLITICAL GOALS.

A. THE INNER LEADERSHIP OF THE PDPA -- AND OF ITS POLITIBURO -- CONSISTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY, NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI; DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, AND DE FACTO DEFENSE MINISTER, HAFIZULLAH AMIN; MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACTING MINISTER OF PLANNING, DR. SHAH WALI; AND MINISTER OF FINANCE, ABDUL KARIM MISAQ. THESE ARE ALL MEMBERS OF THE KHALQ FACTION OF THE PARTY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
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THE PARACHAMIST FACTION LED BY BABRAK KARMAL. AT THE NEXT LEVEL WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP I WOULD LIST DASTAGIR PANJSHIRI, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS; DR. SALEH MOHAMMAD ZIRI, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE; AND FORMER PARACHAMISTS SULAIMAN LAIQ, MINISTER OF RADIO AND TELEVISION; AND MOHAMMAD HASSAN BAREQ-SHAFEYE, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE. NOTABLY MISSING FROM THIS LIST ARE ANY MILITARY FIGURES. MAJOR WATANJAR, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AND MAJOR GULABZOI, MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS, ARE THE ONLY MILITARY OFFICERS LEFT HOLDING IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. YET NEITHER IS A POLITIBURO MEMBER NOR SEEMS TO POSSESS THE INTELLIGENCE OR LEADERSHIP QUALITIES TO POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE REGIME.

TARAKI'S STRENGTH, I BELIEVE, LIES IN HIS BEING VIEWED AS THE FOUNDER, GRAND STRATEGIST AND TACTICIAN OF THE KHALQ PARTY. TARAKI MAY ALSO POSSESS SOME CHARISMA AMONG THE AFGHAN INTELLIGENTSIA. AMIN'S STRENGTH FLOWS FROM HIS ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TALENTS AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, HIS CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. DR. SHAH WALI AND ABDUL KARIM MISAQ, I UNDERSTAND, ARE STRONG ON MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY, AND DEEPLY LOYAL TO BOTH TARAKI AND AMIN.

B. THE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS OF THE LEADERSHIP SINCE TAKING POWER IN APRIL HAVE BEEN TO CONSOLIDATE AND LEGITIMIZE ITS POWER. TO ENSURE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE PARTY APPARATUS AND, CONCOMITANTLY, THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, THEY HAVE STRUCK OUT BOLDLY AND QUICKLY TO REMOVE PERCEIVED THREATS FROM BOTH THE LEFT AND "RIGHT" WITHIN THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT. THUS, TARAKI AND AMIN HAVE REMOVED PARACHAMISTS ON THE LEFT AS WELL AS A NATIONALISTIC, ALTHOUGH LEFTIST, ORIENTED GROUP FURTHER

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TOWARD THE CENTER, ALLEGEDLY HEADED BY FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL QADER. THE TARAKI GROUP'S SUCCESS IN ELIMINATING SO-CALLED OPPORTUNISTS FROM POSITIONS OF POWER WITHIN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED BY THEIR FIRM CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE ESTABLISHMENTS. IN ELIMINATING ONE-TIME SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME, HOWEVER, THE RULING GROUP HAS NARROWED ITS BASE OF SUPPORT, AND MARKEDLY REDUCED THE POOL OF SKILLED HUMAN RESOURCES UPON WHICH IT CAN DRAW.

C. THE LEADERSHIP GROUP HAS AS ITS MAIN INTERNAL GOAL RADICAL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF AFGHAN SOCIETY. ORDINARILY, THIS GOAL WOULD HAVE BEEN COMMENDABLE, GIVEN THE BACKWARD, PRIMITIVE, AND FEUDAL NATURE OF AFGHAN SOCIETY. THE RULING GROUP, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SEE AFGHAN SOCIETY BEING TRANSFORMED THROUGH A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. RATHER, IT SEES TRANSFORMATION TAKING PLACE THROUGH THE LEADERSHIP OF A TIGHTLY KNIT AND WELL-DISCIPLINED MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY HOLDING A MONOPOLY IN POLITICAL POWER. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE RULING ELITE HAS BECOME MORE OPEN ABOUT THE PARTY'S AIMS AND BELIEFS. PARTY TITLES OFTEN PRECEDE GOVERNMENT TITLES. USE OF THE TERM "COMRADE" HAS BECOME NORMAL IN IDENTIFYING MEMBERS OF THE PARTY. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY IS MODELED AFTER THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. MORE AND MORE, TARAHI AND AMIN, IN THEIR MAJOR SPEECHES, TALK ABOUT THE PDPA BEING THE VANGUARD OF THE WORKING CLASS. IN A SPEECH GIVEN ON AUGUST 26, TARAHI SUCCINCTLY SUMMARIZED THE INTERNAL AND WORLD OUTLOOK OF THE PARTY IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS, "OUR REVOLUTION, WHICH IS PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF WORKERS, AIMS TO CARRY OUT THE CLASS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE EXPLOITING CLASSES SO THAT THEY COULD BE VANQUISHED AND THE OPPRESSED CLASSES WOULD DETERMINE THEIR DESTINY ON THEIR OWN. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ENEMIES AT THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEVEL ARE ONE

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AND THE SAME AS EXTERNAL FRIENDS AND ENEMIES OF THE WORLD WORKERS' REVOLUTION". FURTHERMORE, AMIN DECLARED, IN A SEPTEMBER 2 SPEECH, THAT THE PEOPLE'S FUTURE STRUGGLE WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE FAMILIAR SLOGAN: "FROM EACH ACCORDING TO HIS TALENT; TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS NEEDS". THE REGIME IS MAKING INCREASINGLY CLEAR IT PLANS ON ACCOMPLISHING ITS OBJECTIVES BY ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THE SOVIET CAMP ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, AND LOOKING TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FOR EXTENSIVE SUPPORT IN THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FIELDS.

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D. ALTHOUGH THE PERSONAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF TARAKI AND AMIN AND SOME OF THEIR CLOSEST COLLABORATORS IS CLEAR, IT IS DIFFICULT AT THIS POINT TO MEASURE THE COMMITMENT OF LOWER-LEVEL KHALQISTS TO MARXISM-LENINISM. MANY CAN UNDOUBTEDLY BE CLASSIFIED AS OPPORTUNISTS WHO SEE THE KHALQIST-PARCHAMIST MOVEMENT AS A MEANS OF GAINING STATUS AND INFLUENCE IN A SOCIETY IN WHICH UPWARD SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERELY RESTRICTED. OTHERS CONCEIVABLY ARE RELIGIOUS, NATIONALISTIC, AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS. ONE CAN ALSO BE SURE THERE ARE KHALQISTS WHO ARE CONCERNED OVER THE STRONG TILT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, AND WHO WOULD WISH
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TO SEE THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME PURSUE A MORE BALANCED POSTURE EXTERNALLY. ONE OF THE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS U.S. POLICY MUST ATTEMPT TO ANSWER IS HOW WE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE INDEPENDENT-MINDED OFFICIALS IN THE REGIME.

E. DESPITE THEIR LEFTIST ORIENTATION, TARAKI AND AMIN, AS GOVERNMENT LEADERS, HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUS WITH RESPECT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR GOALS. VERY LITTLE IN THE WAY OF RADICAL ECONOMIC CHANGE HAS OCCURRED AND THE REGIME STILL INSTSTS THAT IT IS NOT COMMUNIST, BUT IS, INSTEAD, NATIONALIST, DEMOCRATIC, AND RESPECTFUL OF

ISLAM. IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE, THE EMPHASIS IS STILL ON THE VOLUNTARY FORMATION OF COOPERATIVES RATHER THAN ON FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THERE IS A PLACE IN THE ECONOMY FOR SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED PRIVATE BUSINESSES, AND HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED AFGHNISTAN'S SO-CALLED "NATIONAL CAPITALISTS" THAT THE REGIME WILL RESPECT PRIVATE PROPERTY. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUT THEM ON NOTICE THAT THEY INTEND TO ENSURE THAT THE "NATIONAL CAPITALISTS" TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE "PEOPLE'S INTEREST" IN THEIR ACTIVITIES. MOST "MEANS OF PRODUCTION" WERE ALREADY NATIONALIZED BEFORE THIS REGIME TOOK OVER. ACCORDING TO TARAKI, ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES WILL BE RECOGNIZED. THUS, THE ACTUAL MODEL THAT WE SEE IS SOMEWHAT REMOVED FROM THAT OF RECOGNIZED COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ELSEWHERE. IT IS LIKELY, TOO, THAT TARAKI AND COMPANY DELIBERATELY PLAN TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN CAREFULLY MEASURED STEPS TO PREVENT THEIR FRAGILE REGIME FROM ALIENATING TOO MANY ELEMENTS TOO FAST. THE REGIME HAS ALREADY ADJUSTED TO PERVASIVE AFGHAN REALITIES, AND FURTHER ADJUSTMENT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

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3. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION.

THE NEW REGIME HAS TAKEN SEVERAL COMMENDABLE STEPS IN RELEASING UNJUSTLY-HELD PRISONERS OF THE DAOUDIST ERA, SPEEDING UP THE WHEELS OF JUSTICE IN THE COURT SYSTEM, AND WORKING TO CORRECT MANY SERIOUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INJUSTICES. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE STILL BEING HELD AOXTHE PUL-I-CHARKI PRISON, INCLUDING AS MANY AS 200 WIVES, CHILDREN, AND OTHER RELATIVES OF THE "NADER DYNASTY" BEING KEPT UNDER "PROTECTIVE CUSTODY."

4. INTERNAL ECONOMIC SCENE.

ALTHOUGH RELIABLE STATISTICAL DATA ARE LACKING, IT APPEARS THAT THE AFGHAN ECONOMY HAS BEEN STAGNATING SINCE THE COUP. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS WORRIED ABOUT THE DRA'S INTENTIONS AND HAS REACTED TO INITIAL "SOCIALIST" MEASURES BY ADOPTING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CUSTOMS RECEIPTS -- AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE -- ARE DOWN AS MUCH AS 90 PERCENT FROM LEVELS OF A YEAR AGO. WE HAVE HAD REPORTS OF SHORTAGES OF CERTAIN STAPLES RECENTLY, INCLUDING RICE, VEGETABLE OIL, AND PERHAPS TEA AND SUGAR AS WELL. THIS YEAR'S WHEAT HARVEST, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GOOD. THERE ARE STRONG RUMORS THOUGH THAT CONSUMERS ARE

HOARDING STAPLES LEST CIVIL UNREST CATCH THEM WITH THEIR PANTRIES
DOWN, AND, THEREFORE, WHEAT PRICES, WHICH HAD BEEN FALLING,
HAVE NOW BEGUN AN UPWARD TURN. ROUTISM IS OFF -- ALTHOUGH THE
DRA HOPES TO REVERSE THAT TREND -- AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT REMAINS
NIL. WE HAVE NO CURRENT ESTIMATES REGARDING EXPORTS.
AFGHANISTAN'S NET OFFICIAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
REMAIN HIGH, ABOUT \$320-330 MILLION, ACCORDING TO OUR
LATEST ESTIMATE, EQUAL TO THE VALUE OF ABOUT ONE YEAR'S
IMPORTS. THEORETICALLY, THE DRA COULD DRAW FROM THOSE
RESERVES TO FINANCE NEEDED IMPORTS. TWO FACTORS WORK
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AGAINST THIS, HOWEVER: ALL AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING
THE PRESENT ONE, HAVE BEEN FISCALLY VERY CONSERVATIVE
AND ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE RESERVES DWINDLE; AND, THE
DRA IS PROBABLY INCAPABLE OF ARRANGING COMMERCIAL
IMPORTS EXPEDITIOUSLY SINCE MOST IMPORTS HAVE TRADITIONALLY
BEEN HANDLED BY THE NOW IDEOLOGICALLY SUSPECT PRIVATE
SECTOR.

THE DRA WILL LIKELY CONTINUE PAST PRACTICES OF RELYING
HEAVILY ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO FINANCE SLIGHTLY MORE
THAN HALF OF ITS DEVELOPMENT BUDGET. MOREOVER, FOREIGN
AID IS ESSENTIAL FOR GETTING VIABLE PROJECTS DESIGNED
AND IMPLEMENTED.

IN THE SHORT TERM, THE DRA'S MAIN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL
BE TO ENCOURAGE RENEWED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY -- AND HENCE
GOVERNMENTAL REVENUES -- AND TO AVOID SERIOUS AND
PROLONGED SHORTAGES OF STAPLE COMMODITIES. SEVERE
SHORTAGES COULD ADD MEASURABLY TO PUBLIC DISCONTENT WITH
THE REGIME.

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LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; CINCEUR FOR POLAD

5. AFGHAN ECONOMIC PLANS AND U.S. ASSISTANCE.

A. THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS NOT AS YET CLEARLY DEFINED ITS INTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICIES AND GOALS EXCEPT IN VERY GENERAL TERMS. A KEY INDICATOR OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITIES WILL BE ITS FIVE-YEAR PLAN, WHICH IS TO BE IN FINAL FORM BY THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION, I.E., APRIL 1979: THE BIG QUESTION MARK IS WHETHER THE REGIME WILL OPT FOR AN AGRICULTURE-LED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AS OUTLINED BY THE WORLD BANK, AN APPROACH WITH WHICH WE AGREE, OR FOLLOW THE SOVIET MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON INDUSTRY.

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ALTHOUGH THE FORMER MINISTER OF PLANNING, SULTAN ALI KISHTMAND, HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM OFFICE, HE PROVIDED A CLUE TO THE ECONOMIC DIRECTION IN WHICH THE NEW REGIME WOULD MOVE IN AN INTERVIEW WHICH APPEARED IN THE JULY 21 ISSUE OF THE POLISH PERIODICAL "PERSPEKTYWY". IN THAT INTERVIEW, KISHTMAND SAID THE NEW GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO FOLLOW A NONCAPITALIST PATH OF DEVELOPMENT. ACCORDING TO KISHTMAND, THE TARAKI REGIME INTENDS TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE STATE SECTOR, ESPECIALLY INDUSTRY, AND GIVE IT THE DOMINANT POSITION IN THE ECONOMY. HE ALSO INDICATED THE REGIME WOULD CARRY OUT AGRARIAN REFORMS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WITH A THOROUGHGOING REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND NOW IN LARGE HOLDINGS, AND THE GRADUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF COOPERATIVE FARMS. STATE CONTROL IS TO BE ESTABLISHED OVER FOREIGN TRADE. KISHTMAND ALSO STATED AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT FOLLOW WESTERN ADVICE TO REMAIN A PREDOMINANTLY AGRARIAN COUNTRY, OR TO DEVELOP ONLY THOSE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY WHICH ARE BASED ON AGRICULTURE. HE DID CONCEDE THAT HELP FROM ABROAD WOULD BE NEEDED TO

CARRY OUT THESE PLANS.

B. ALTHOUGH THE TARAKI REGIME CAME TO POWER WITH AN APPARENT IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, IT DID NOT COME WITH EITHER A COHERENT OR ARTICULATED STRATEGY FOR MEETING ECONOMIC GROWTH TARGETS AND BASIC HUMAN NEEDS.

C. OUR ASSISTANCE STRATEGY, OUTLINED IN THE APRIL 1978 COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT (CDSS), RECOMMENDED A PROGRAM DIRECTED AT THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF DEVELOPMENT AND POSITED AN INFLUENTIAL POLICY ROLE FOR USAID. WHILE THE DRA'S SIGNALS ARE NOT AT ALL CLEAR, THE USIAD STRATEGY OUTLINED IN APRIL IS IN NEED OF REVIEW IN
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LIGHT OF CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. DESPITE OUR PRIOR PRE-EMINENT ROLE IN THE HEALTH SECTOR AND A NEW PROJECT PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT BUDGET SUPPORT, THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAS INITIALLY IMPOSED ARBITRARY PERSONNEL AND OTHER CONDITIONS WHICH, IF UN-CHANGED, THREATEN TO SCUTTLE THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY. DESPITE A VERY REAL CONCERN FOR WHAT PRODUCTION IN THE COUNTRY AND ENTHUSIASTIC ENCOURAGEMENT FOR OUR JOINT PARTICIPATION WITH THE WORLD BANK IN A GRAIN STABILIZATION PROGRAM, THE DRA HAS RECENTLY REJECTED A PROPOSED USAID PROJECT DIRECTED AT INTEGRATED WHEAT PRODUCTION NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH. THESE NEGATIVE SIGNALS REFLECT AN APPARENT CONCERN WITH OUR SECTORS OF CONCENTRATION, NUMBERS OF TECHNICAL ADVISERS, PHYSICAL LOCATION OF PROJECTS, AND THE GROUND RULES FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS RANGE FROM

SUSPICION OF INDIVIDUALS, TRADITIONAL ANTIPATHY TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, A REAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF EITHER OUR PURPOSES OR PROCEDURES, ALTERNATIVE PRIORITIES, AND NEGATIVE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OR GRIEVANCES NOW BUOYED UP BY THE HEADY SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION.

D. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE A FIRM REQUEST FOR MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE PRIME MINISTRY'S EFFORTS AT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM. WE HAVE ALSO EXPERIENCED GENUINE ENTHUSIASM FOR OUR PROPOSED ENTRY INTO SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION. THE MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION CONTINUES TO VIEW OUR PROPOSED ASSISTANCE IN PRIMARY TEACHER TRAINING POSITIVELY, WHICH INCLUDES A LARGE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPONENT. THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IS ALSO ENCOURAGING US TO DESIGN A PRIMARY SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. CONSEQUENTLY, I AM HARD PRESSED TO DETECT A PATTERN, AND EACH MINISTRY FOR THE

TIME BEING SEEMS TO MARCH TO ITS OWN DRUMMER -- ALTHOUGH
WITH THE MINISTER OF HEALTH NOW ALSO SHARING THE PLANNING
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PORTFOLIO, IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO NOTE WHETHER OUR
NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE IN HEALTH WILL BE REPEATED ELSEWHERE.
ALTHOUGH IT MAY WELL BE TRUE THAT CERTAIN IDEOLOGIES IN

THE CURRENT REGIME MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE ENTHUSIASTIC
ABOUT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PROGRAMS, I BELIEVE IT
WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ASSUME ALL STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS
CONCERNING U.S. ASSISTANCE ARISE ENTIRELY, PRIMARILY, OR
CONSISTENTLY FROM THAT PREMISE.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E. AS AN INTERIM STRATEGY, I WOULD CONCUR WITH THE OVER-ALL AND FLEXIBLE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL. OUR ASSISTANCE PORTFOLIO WILL HAVE TO BE FUILL AND JUDGED PROJECT BY PROJECT. WHILE EACH PROJECT MUST BE RELATED TO THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE POOR, THEY SHOULD NOT BE EXPLICITLY LINKED TO SECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY CHANGES AS PROPOSED IN THE RECENT CDSS. RATHER, IT SHOULD BE OUR TASK TO BUILD DRA CONFIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY IN CONFIDENTIAL

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OUR PROGRAMS, AND EXPAND U.S. EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHAT THE REVOLUTION MAY OR MAY NOT MEAN FOR THE POOR IN AFGHANISTAN. SHOULD THE DRA DEVELOP A REAL FIVE-YEAR PLAN PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOR MEETING THE VERY REAL HUMAN NEEDS OF ITS RURAL POPULATIONS, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MATCH PERFORMANCE WITH SUPPORT, ASSUMING A FAVORABLE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. BUT, IN THE INTERIM, WHILE OUR ASSISTANCE IS PERHAPS PERCEIVED BY SOME LEADERS OF THE DRA AS TIED TO POLITICAL STRINGS AND AS PART OF A POLITICAL TESTING PERIOD, OUR ASSISTANCE SHOULD REMAIN TIED TO THEIR INITIATIVE AND TO SOUND PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR ELIGIBILITY. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO BE FREE FROM THE MONEY-GRABBING GAME THAT AFGHANS HAVE TRADITIONALLY MADE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, TO ASSURE THAT WE ARE NOT BEING USED SIMPLY TO MEET THEIR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND TO ENSURE THAT OUR ASSISTANCE IS RESPONSIVE TO THE OBJECTIVES AS SET FORTH IN THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT. THE USAID MISSION WILL CONSIDER THIS FRAMEWORK IN REVISING THEIR CDSS, WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED EARLY IN 1979.

6. GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

A. THERE APPEAR TO BE THREE DOMINANT THEMES IN THE PRESENT REGIME'S FOREIGN POLICY. FIRST, THERE IS A STRONG IDEOLOGICAL COMPATIBILITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOCIALIST CAMP". FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN HAS MADE IT CLEAR ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT THIS GROUP CONSTITUTES THE TRUE FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF THE NONALIGNED CAMP. SECONDLY, THE DRA PLACES A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE NONALIGNED CAMP, AND, WITHIN THIS GROUP, ON DEVELOPING CLOSE RELATIONS CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH RADICAL ELEMENTS, I.E., STATES SUCH AS CUBA, ANGOLA, SOUTH YEMEN, MOZAMBIQUE, LIBYA, AND ALGERIA. THE THIRD THREAD OF AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY IS A PRE-OCCUPATION WITH PAKISTAN. ON THE ONE HAND, THIS PRE-OCCUPATION HARBORS A CONCERN THAT PAKISTAN IS THE ONE COUNTRY CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING WITH FINANCIAL AND MILITARY MEANS GROUPS INTERESTED IN SUBVERTING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS THE AFGHAN VIEW THAT PAKISTAN IS WEAK INTERNALLY, AND THAT IT WILL DISINTEGRATE IN THE FUTURE, THUS PRESENTING A REVITALIZED AFGHANISTAN WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REINCORPORATE PUSHTUNISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN INTO A GREATER AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THE TARAKI REGIM'S PERCEPTION OF A POTENTIAL SHORT-TERM THREAT FROM PAKISTAN, IT LOOKS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT AND POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE.

B. SINCE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS PREOCCUPIED WITH CONSOLIDATING ITS POWER INTERNALLY, IT SEEMS PREDICTABLE THAT THE TARAKI REGIME WOULD REPEATEDLY PRESS THE SO-CALLED "NATIONAL ISSUE" OF THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH PEOPLES IN PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO DISTRACT DOMESTIC ATTENTION IN THIS XENOPHOBIC COUNTRY. AT PAKISTANI URGING, THE LEADERSHIP HERE HAS AVOIDED USING THE TERM "PUSHTUNISTAN" IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. I DOUBT WHETHER THIS IS MUCH OF A CONSOLATION TO ISLAMABAD. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE PRESENT "NATIONAL DESTINY" FORMULATION HARBORS AN IRREDENTIST APPROACH TO THE ISSUE. AMIN'S COMMENT TO AMBASSADOR ELIOT THAT HE HOPED FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE PAKISTANIS, ON PUSHTUNISTAN, AKIN TO WHAT WE DID ON PANAMA, CLEARLY POINTS TO A DESIRE FOR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT -- LIKE DAOUD BEFORE THEM -- REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS SUCH AS TARAKI AND AMIN BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS WEAK INTERNALLY AND THAT THE DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME..
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IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE AFGHANS PROBABLY HOPE THE PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHS IN PAKISTAN WOULD OPT FOR ASSIMILATION WITHIN A GREATER AFGHANISTAN. IN THE MEANTIME, THE AFGHANS ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A TIME WHEN THEY CAN FIND A SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES OR SEPARATIST GROUPS IN PUSHTUNISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN. WHILE POTENTIAL SEPARATIST LEADERS MAY EXIST IN BALUCHISTAN, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE TARAKI REGIME IS NOT AS FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARD PUSHTUN LEADERS, SUCH AS AJMAL KHATTAK

AND WALI KHAN, AS WAS THE PREVIOUS DAOUD REGIME. THE
BASIS FOR THIS COOLNESS EVIDENTLY RESTS IN THE BELIEF
HERE THAT KHATTAK AND WALI KHAN ARE ESSENTIALLY

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AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 8 KABUL 7370

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; CINCEUR FOR POLAD

PUSHTUN NATIONALISTS WHO WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH FINDING A
FEDERAL FUTURE WITHIN PAKISTAN, SHOULD THEIR POLITICAL, CULTURAL,
ECONOMIC AND ETHNIC RIGHTS BE MORE FULLY APPRECIATED AND RECOG-
NIZED BY ISLAMABAD. THE TARAKI REGIME MAY THIS BE PRESSING THE
"NATIONAL ISSUE" OF THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH PEOPLES FOR A NUMBER OF
REASONS: (1) LIKE THE DAOUD REGIME BEFORE IT, THIS GOVT PROBABLY
BELIEVES IT MUST PURSUE THE QUESTION TO PLACATE AFGHAN PUSHTUNS,
WHO MAKE UP 35 TO 45 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION; (2) PRESSING THE
ISSUE PUBLICLY TENDS TO PUT PAKISTAN OFF BALANCE AT A TIME WHEN
THE NEW REGIME IN KABUL IS ATTEMPTING TO CONSOLIDATE ITS OWN POWER
INTERNALLY; (3) BY GIVING THIS ISSUE PUBLIC ATTENTION, THE DRA
KEEPS ITS OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE FUTURE; AND, (4) AS NOTED ABOVE,
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A "FOREIGN DEVIL" IS A USEFUL STRAWMAN WHEN THERE ARE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. IF PAKISTAN DISINTEGRATES OR FAILS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROFESSED GRIEVANCES OF THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH PEOPLES, SEPARATISM OR INTEGRATION INTO AFGHANISTAN MAY BECOME A POSSIBILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE TARAKI REGIME REMAIN WEAK WHILE PAKISTAN REVITALIZES ITSELF, KABUL COULD EVENTUALLY MOVE TOWARD SOME RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER (AS DAOUD SEEMED TO BE DOING IN HIS FINAL MONTHS), IN RETURN FOR WHICH KABUL WOULD SEEK PROMISES OF PAKISTANI ABSTINENCE FROM SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED SENSITIVITY TO AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS THROUGH PAKISTAN. IN ANY CASE, THE TARAKI REGIME IS LIKELY TO COUNT HEAVILY UPON THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT AFGHAN POLICY ON THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH ISSUES. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY FIND THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE A USEFUL LEVER TO USE IN VARIOUS WAYS AGAINST EITHER THE AFGHANS OR THE PAKISTANIS.

C. WHAT IS SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED IN AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY IS THE INCONGRUITY BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL NEEDS, THAT IS, FOR WIDE-RANGING FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND ITS PRO-SOVIET RHETORIC AND ASSOCIATION WITH RADICAL NON-ALIGNED ELEMENTS, A LINE WHICH IS SOONER OR LATER BOUND TO OFFEND WESTERN AND MUSLIM DONORS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY LINE MIGHT BE A CUTBACK OF WESTERN AND MUSLIM ASSISTANCE SUPPORT AND, PERHAPS, INCREASED RELIANCE ON THE SOVIETS, THE EAST GERMANS, THE CZECHS, AND THE BULGARIANS.

7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

A. GIVEN ITS IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE TARAKI REGIME SEES THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY AS ITS PRINCIPAL

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SOURCE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BUT AS ITS PROTECTOR AND DEFENDER AGAINST POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE MOVES BY PAKISTAN AND IRAN. TO ENHANCE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW, THE TARAKI REGIME HAS CONSISTENTLY PRAISED THE SOVIET UNION PUBLICLY, AND ACCEPTED GROWING NUMBERS OF SOVIET CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVISERS (TOTALING AN ESTIMATED 3,000), TO ASSIST IN CONSOLIDATING ITS POWER. WHILE TARAKI AND AMIN MAY BOTH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SOME INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION, THEY APPEAR TO BE PURSUING POLICIES WHICH CAN ONLY MAKE THE REGIME INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. IT IS THEREFORE AN OPEN QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT

AFGHANISTAN, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TARAHI AND AMIN, CAN
AVOID BECOMING A PLIANT INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY --
IN SPITE OF THE REGIME'S PROFESSED DDESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

B. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE
GO-SLOW APPROACH TARAHI HAS TAKEN IN LAUNCHING HIS ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL REFORM PROGRAMS. THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY RECOGNIZE THAT
RADICAL CHANGES COULD ENDANGER THE GOVT IN VIEW OF THE STRONG
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND CONSERVATIVE BENT OF AFGHAN SOCIETY. MOSCOW,
WE BELIEVE, WOULD THUS AGREE MORE WITH THE TACTICS OF TARAHI THAN
WITH THOSE OF BABRAK KARMAL, WHO WAS EVIDENTLY INTENT UPON
PUSHING FORWARD VIGOROUSLY TO MOVE AFGHANISTAN ALONG A SOCIALIST
COURSE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS MIGHT SERIOUSLY QUESTION
WHETHER TARAHI AND AMIN HAVE MOVED WISELY IN ELIMINATING SO-
CALLED "OPPORTUNISTS", THUS NARROWING THE REGIME'S INTERNAL
POLITICAL POWER BASE. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
SOVIETS WILL PROVIDE, ALBEIT PERHAPS RELUCTANTLY, THE TYPE OF
ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD ENSURE THIS LEFTIST REGIME'S
SURVIVAL. MOSCOW, HOWEVER, IS NOT COMMITTED TO ANY ONE AFGHAN
LEADER AND COULD, PERHAPS, LIVE WITH ALMOST ANY MODERATE OR LEFTIST
REGIME WHICH CAN SECURE AND HOLD POWER IN AFGHANISTAN.

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R 140520Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 005
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 7 OF 8 KABUL 7370

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

C. AS THE SOVIET ROLE EXPANDS, WE ANTICIPATE THAT MOSCOW WILL SEEK TO LIMIT U.S. INFLUENCE HERE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR PRE-APRIL 27 OBJECTIONS TO ANY PROGRAM WHICH WOULD BRING AN AMERICAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PRESENCE NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH. THEIR OBJECTIONS PERHAPS EXPLAIN WHY THE AFGHANS HAVE TOLD US RECENTLY THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE BAGHLAN INTEGRATED WHEAT PROJECT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE ONLY EQUIPMENT, BUT REFRAIN FROM STATIONING AMERICAN PERSONNEL
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AT THE PROJECT. SINCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR SOME TIME PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN ASSISTING AFGHANISTAN IN MINERAL AND GAS EXPLOITATION, WE ALSO SUSPECT THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S DECISION NOT TO PROCEED WITH A CONTRACT WITH CITIES SERVICES TO EXPLORE FOR GAS AND OIL IN SOUTHWESTERN AFGHANISTAN REFLECTS SOME SOVIET INFLUENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, MANY AFGHANS SUSPECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPLOITING AFGHANISTAN BY PURCHASING AFGHAN GAS AT BELOW WORLD MARKET PRICES AND THEN EXPORTING GAS TO THE WEST FOR HARD CURRENCY FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN FIELDS. MANY AFGHANS BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE ECONOMICAL TO USE THE GAS INTERNALLY, OR AT LEAST TO SEE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CHARGED A REALISTIC PRICE.)

D. WHILE THE SOVIETS MEY BE INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE INFLUENCE OF FREE-WORLD DONORS HERE TO A MINIMUM, THEY MIGHT ALSO WISH TO SEE FINANCIAL AID FROM VARIOUS DONORS CONTINUED, RECOGNIZING THAT THIS WOULD LESSEN THE ECONOMIC BURDEN FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

8. FUTURE OF THE REGIME.

A. AT A TIME WHEN THE REGIME SHOULD BE FOCUSING ON BROADENING ITS POWER BASE, IT IS UNDERTAKING ACTIONS WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY NARROW IT. MANY PARCHAMISTS HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY REMOVED FROM POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE MILITARY, THUS ALIENATING AN IMPORTANT GROUP WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE TAKEOVER OF POWER IN APRIL. SOME NATIONALISTIC ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACIES, SYMBOLIZED MOST PROMINENTLY BY FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE ABDUL QADER, HAVE ALSO BEEN DISMISSED AND ALIENATED. RESISTANCE

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TO THE NEW REGIME WITHIN TRIBAL AREAS SUCH AS PAKTIA, KUNAR, NANGARHAR, AND BADA KHSHAN CONTINUES, AND IT IS PROVING TROUBLESOME AND A DRAIN ON LIMITED MILITARY RESOURCES -- AS WELL AS A STRAIN ON THE CONTINUED LOYALTY OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THIS REGIME WILL DEAL REASONABLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH DISSIDENT TRIBAL GROUPS, OR WHETHER IT WILL OVERREACT MILITARILY, THUS GENERATING INCREASED RESISTANCE AND DIS-AFFECTED REACTION IN THE MILITARY RANKS. IN THE LATTER CASE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE NEW REGIME WILL BE ENDANGERED BY DISSIPATING ITS ENERGIES AND RESOURCES IN AN ENDLESS STRUGGLE. ADDED TO THESE PROBLEMS ARE THE STRONG SUSPICIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT THE NEW REGIME IS ATHEISTIC AND BECOMING EVER-MORE SUBSERVIENT TO THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE DEEPLY DISLIKED AND FEARED BY THE DEVOUT MUSLIMS OF AFGHANISTAN. AWARE OF THE XENOPHOBIA OF THE AFGHANS, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE MAINTAINING, CONSCIOUSLY, A LOW-PROFILE OUTWARD PRESENCE, ESPECIALLY WHERE MILITARY ADVISERS ARE CONCERNED. EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT THE RIGHT-WING MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IS ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THE FUTURE INTENTIONS OF THIS REGIME ARE DEEPLY SUSPECT ON THE PART OF SMALL BUSINESSMEN, UPON WHOM SO MUCH OF THIS ECONOMY DEPENDS. MANY OFFICIALS WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FORMER DAOUD REGIME ARE NOW AT HOME WITHOUT JOBS. AS THE REGIME HAS NARROWED ITS BASE OF SUPPORT, IT HAS THUS LOST A GOOD PORTION OF THE LIMITED NUMBER OF TALENTED, TRAINED PEOPLE AVAILABLE, AND HAS WEAKENED THE REGIME ADMINISTRATIVELY.

B. IN VIEW OF THE GROWING DISAFFECTION AND ALIENATION, SOME OBSERVERS HERE ARE ASKING HOW LONG THE REGIME CAN SURVIVE, WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME, DESPITE ITS DIFFICULTIES, WILL MUDDLE THROUGH. THE KEY WILL OBVIOUSLY BE THE CONTINUED LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY AND

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THE POLICE ESTABLISHMENTS. AS TIME GOES ON, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE -- IF THE PRESENT TREND CONTINUES -- THAT THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO RELY INCREASINGLY ON THE SOVIETS, BOTH FOR MILITARY HELP IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS CHALLENGE, AND FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND EVEN POLITICAL POLICIES.

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R 140520Z SEP 78
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC
USCINCEUR

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LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

C. IF THE TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP FALTERS, THE QUESTION
ARISES AS TO WHO MIGHT TAKE OVER. ONE POSSIBILITY IS,
OF COURSE, THE PARCHAMISTS, WHO MIGHT PREVAIL WITH THE
SUPPORT OF THE SOVIETS. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD PROBABLY
MEAN A CONTINUED, AND PERHAPS INCREASED, RELIANCE
ON THE SOVIET UNION. ON THE EXTREME RIGHT OF THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM, A VIOLENT TAKEOVER BY LEADERS OF THE
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD WITH THE SUPPORT OF SYMPATHETIC
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ELEMENTS WITHIN

THE MILITARY IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE. WHILE THE ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY CONSERVATIVE, RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A DIMINUTION OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE, AND COULD PROVOKE DIRECT SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO A THREATENED LEFTIST REGIME, IT COULD ALSO MEAN A SETBACK TO THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN. A THIRD POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A COUNTERCOUP LED BY NATIONALISTIC ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WHO WOULD RELY ON CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF A LIBERAL BUT INDEPENDENT BENT. AT THIS MOMENT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY AN INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS AROUND WHOM AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION OF SUCH A STRIKE MIGHT COALESCE, UNLESS ONE COUNTS THOSE IN PRISON OR EXILE. BUT WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE PREVIOUS OLIGARCHY, IT IS CERTAIN THAT MORE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE POPULATION THAN EVER BEFORE HAVE BECOME POLITICIZED AND WILL SEEK POWER OR BRING PRESSURES TO BEAR ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND GROUPS WHICH THEY REPRESENT. THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND FOR CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY IS THUS LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME.

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

A. OUR INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE: (1) TO ENCOURAGE A GENUINELY NONALIGNED AND INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN; (2) TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF THESE VERY POOR PEOPLE; (3) TO ENCOURAGE THE LEADERSHIP TO PLAY A STABILIZING RATHER THAN DESTABILIZING ROLE IN THE SUBCONTINENT, BY LIVING WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND ABJURING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST PAKISTAN AND IRAN; (4) TO WORK WITH THIS COUNTRY AND

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THE U.N. TOWARD THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ERADICATING POPPY CULTIVATION AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING; AND, (5) TO ENCOURAGE THE AFGHAN REGIME TO PURSUE AN ENLIGHTENED HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

B. GIVEN THE LEFTIST DIRECTION IN WHICH THE TARAKI REGIME SEEMS TO BE MOVING, WE FACE A DILEMMA IN WORKING TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVES. ON THE ONE HAND, OUR ASSISTANCE AND OUR PRESENCE, ALTHOUGH LIMITED IN MAGNITUDE, MIGHT BE SEEN AS GIVING SUPPORT AND LEGITIMACY TO A REGIME WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO OUR OWN AND THOSE OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THIS FEELING MIGHT BECOME EXACERBATED WERE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY TO

DETERIORATE (ASIDE FROM THE POLITICAL PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD AT PUL-I-CHARKI AND, PERHAPS, ELSEWHERE, THIS SITUATION IS FORTUNATELY NOT WORSENING AT THIS TIME). ON THE OTHER HAND, A SEVERE CUTBACK OF ASSISTANCE BY THE U.S. AND OTHER IMPORTANT DONORS WOULD PROBABLY INTENSIFY THE DRA'S EMBRACE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, THUS HEIGHTENING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DRA MIGHT BECOME A DE FACTO APPENDAGE IN THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

C. SINCE IT IS APPARENT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS INTENSELY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVATIONS, IT MAY ITSELF TAKE THE DECISION TO CUT OUR PRESENCE TO A MINIMUM LEVEL, RELYING INCREASINGLY ON THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP, SUCH AS THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND BULGARIA.

D. THE OPERATIONAL QUESTION WE FACE IS WHAT STRATEGY AND TACTICS WE SHOULD PURSUE AT THIS TIME. IN AN EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE SPIRIT OF INDEPENDENCE WHICH RUNS DEEP WITHIN THE AFGHAN CHARACTER, I RECOMMEND WE MAINTAIN, FOR THE TIME BEING, A VERY RESTRAINED POSTURE TOWARD THE TARAKI REGIME, THAT WE BE HIGHLY SELECTIVE WITH RESPECT
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TO ENTERING INTO ANY NEW U.S. COMMITMENTS HERE, AND THAT WE NOT ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS IN PROJECTS WHICH CONTAIN DISCRIMINATORY CONDITIONS. THE CHANCES OF GETTING A MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP WOULD BE IMPROVED IF DONORS SUCH AS IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE FRG, AND JAPAN TOOK A SIMILAR APPROACH.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE WE COULD NOW SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO JOINING WITH OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND CHINA TO UNDERTAKE URGENT EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY, AND TO MEET REASONABLE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. SUCH A POLICY COULD ALSO PAY DIVIDENDS IN IRAN AND CHINA BY DEMONSTRATING TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. IS CAPABLE AND PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE MEANINGFUL ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF ITS FRIENDS. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE BEST WAY OF INHIBITING THE SOUTHWARD AND SOUTHWESTWARD EXPANSION OF SOVIET POWER VIA A POSSIBLY PLIANT AFGHANISTAN IS A TIER OF STATES -- IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA -- WORKING TOGETHER, WITH OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WHERE NECESSARY, TO BUILD HEALTHY, DYNAMIC, JUST, AND PROSPEROUS SOCIETIES.
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Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1435871
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND US-AFGHAN RELATIONS
TAGS: EAID, PEPR, PGOV, PINR, PINT, AF, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7c64b350-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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